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[1] Because of a conviction that e-discovery presents unique issues
requiring uniform national rules, the Judicial Conference of the United
States (“Judicial Conference”) has recommended and the Supreme Court
has approved a number of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“Proposed Rules”), which are scheduled to go into effect at the
end of 2006.2 The Proposed Rules include provisions to address issues
relating to the production of electronically stored information3 and, for the
1

© 2006 Thomas Y. Allman. Mr. Allman is Senior Counsel to Mayer, Brown, Rowe &
Maw, LLP and served as Senior Vice-President and General Counsel of BASF
Corporation from 1993 until 2004. He is a member of the Sedona Conference WG1
Steering Committee on Electronic Information Management and co-chair of the Lawyers
for Civil Justice Committee on Electronic Discovery. He was an early advocate of ediscovery amendments. See Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for Federal Standards
Regarding Electronic Discovery, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 209 (2001).
2
The Proposed Rules and Committee Notes can be found on the website of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL
RULEMAKING, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrules6.html#cv0804 (last visited May
14, 2006).; see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf [hereinafter STANDING
COMMITTEE REPORT] (containing the final version of the Rules and the Committee Notes
and the introductory explanations to the Judicial Conference not found on the
Administrative Office site noted above).
3
U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL RULEMAKING,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrules6.html#cv0804 (last visited May 14, 2006).
“[E]lectronically stored information” is the term adopted by the Proposed Rules to
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first time, add limitations on rule-based sanctions regarding failure to
produce that type of information. They also establish a new paradigm of
mandatory early discussion of contentious issues, including preservation
of potentially discoverable information.
[2] This article examines the Proposed Rules and their likely impact. Its
premise is that the Proposed Rules represent a remarkable and balanced
achievement which will have a positive influence. The article concludes
with some modest suggestions for my former colleagues who will deal
with the Proposed Rules from within corporate entities.
INTRODUCTION
[3] The Proposed Rules were developed by the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee of the Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference
(“Advisory Committee”). 4 The original package of rules and committee
notes was released for public comment in August 2004.5 It resulted from
substantial interaction with the bench and bar over a period of several
years,6 and evolved out of a set of recommendations by a subcommittee of
the Advisory Committee.7 Those recommendations were the focus of
uniquely capture that information in electronic form which is subject to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”). The term is generally used throughout the
discovery rules included in the package. See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
2, at Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45, & Form 35.
4
The official title of the Standing Committee is “The Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States” and it includes advisory
committees on appellate, bankruptcy, civil, criminal and evidence rules. James C. Duff,
The Rulemaking Process: A Summary for the Bench and Bar (Oct. 2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm.
5
See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.pdf
[hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, AUGUST 2004].
6
Mini-conferences on e-discovery issues had been held at Hastings Law School and
Brooklyn Law School in 2000. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, AUGUST 2004, supra
note 5, at 5. “Since then, bar organizations, attorneys, computer specialists, and members
of the public have devoted much time and energy in helping the rules committees
understand and address the serious problems arising from discovery of electronically
stored information.” STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 22.
7
Richard J. Marcus, Consultant to the Discovery Subcommittee, issued a comprehensive
(63 page) report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in September 2003 on behalf
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extensive discussions at a conference on e-discovery held at Fordham Law
School prior to their finalization for public comment.8 The discussion
occurred against a backdrop of evolving case law in the federal courts, the
adoption of state9 and local district court rules,10 and the issuance of “best
practice” guidelines by the Sedona Conference11 and the ABA Section on
Litigation.12 In part, the decision to proceed with the rule-making process

of the Discovery Subcommittee which presaged most of the eventual amendments, albeit
in preliminary form for discussion only. See E-Discovery Rule Discussion Proposals
(Sept 15, 2003), http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/civilrules/marcus091503a.pdf.
8
The Conference was held at Fordham University Law School in February 2004.
Participants in the Conference came from a wide cross-section of participants in the ediscovery process. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMORANDUM (Jan. 27, 2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/E-Discovery_Conf_Agenda_Materials.pdf.
9
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 (2006) (requiring production of all responsive electronic data
which is “reasonably available to the responding party in its ordinary course of business”
and allowing an objection if it cannot be retrieved by “reasonable efforts.”); MISS. R. CIV.
P. 26(b)(5) (2006) (imposing the same requirements as Texas). Texas and Mississippi
differ on whether mandatory cost-shifting is appropriate. Compare TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4
(2006) with MISS R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (2006). Cf. CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 2017(e)(2)
(repealed 2005) (limiting orders to produce in electronic media which create an undue
economic burden or hardship).
10
A common thread in all district court rules was an emphasis on informed early
discussion and participation in preparation for Rule 26(f) and Rule 16(b) scheduling
orders. See, e.g., E.D. & W.D. ARK. LOC. R. 26.1; D. DEL. R. 16.4(b); D.N.J. LOC. CIV.
R. 26.1; D. WYO. LOC. R. 26.1 & Appendix D; United States District Court, District of
Kansas, Electronic Discovery Guidelines,
http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/guidelines/electronicdiscoveryguidelines.pdf.
11
The Sedona Principles, a set of fourteen “best practice” recommendations intended for
the courts and parties, were developed by an ad hoc group of experienced representatives
of producing parties, in-house counsel, technology companies, and service providers after
an initial meeting in October 2002. See generally The Sedona Conference, The Sedona
Principles: Best Practices Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic
Document Production (2005), http://www.thesedonaconference.org [hereinafter The
Sedona Principles]. For a comparison of The Sedona Principles and the initial rule
proposals, see Thomas Y. Allman, Proposed National E-Discovery Standards and the
Sedona Principles, 72 DEF. COUNS. J. 47 (2005) (arguing that they are basically
consistent).
12
See American Bar Association, Electronic Discovery Task Force, Report 103B,
Amendments to the Civil Discovery Standards (2004),
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/taskforces/electronic/ (follow “Final Revised Standards”
hyperlink).
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was motivated by a concern for the possible consequences of inaction at
the national level.13
[4] The final form of the Proposed Rules differs from the original
proposals in several major respects and came into being only after
extensive public hearings held in San Francisco, Dallas and Washington,
D.C. in January and February 2005 (“Public Hearings”).14 They were
revised at an April 2005 meeting of the Advisory Committee15 and
subsequently reported to16 and approved by the Standing Committee.17
The Judicial Conference gave its approval to the full package in
September 2005 and the Supreme Court added its endorsement in April
2006.18 Assuming—as is expected—that Congress takes no action to
prevent their enactment, the Proposed Rules will go into effect on
December 1, 2006.
PRODUCTION FROM ACCESSIBLE SOURCES
[5] The first major innovation in the Proposed Rules relates to the scope
of the obligation of a producing party to search for and produce relevant
and non-privileged electronically stored information as part of an initial
13

The Standing Committee is concerned that “[w]ithout national rules adequate to
address the issues raised by electronic discovery, a patchwork of rules and requirements
is likely to develop,” resulting in “uncertainty, expense, delays, and burdens” being
imposed on both small organizations and individual litigants as well as large public and
private organizations. STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
14
The Public Hearings were held by the Advisory Committee on January 12 in San
Francisco, January 28 in Dallas and February 11 in Washington, D.C. Comments were
accepted through February 15, 2005. United States Courts, Civil Rules Comments Chart
(2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery.html (providing copies of the
comments and transcripts of the remarks of testifying witnesses).
15
See generally Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Minutes (April 14–15, 2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC0405.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Committee
Minutes, April 2005].
16
See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Advisory Committee Report to Standing Committee (May 27, 2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV5-2005.pdf.
17
See generally Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes (June 15–16,
2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ST_June_2005.pdf.
18
The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2000). The statute authorizes the
Supreme Court and “all courts established by Act of Congress” to “prescribe rules for the
conduct of their business.” Id. § 2071.
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disclosure19 or in response to a request for production.20 Under amended
Rule 26(b)(2)(B), absent a court order, a party need only search and
produce from “reasonably accessible” sources of electronically stored
information, provided that it also identifies those sources which it regards
as “not reasonably accessible” to opposing counsel.21 Whether a
particular source is, in fact, “not reasonably accessible” turns on whether
the act of acquiring the information from it involves “undue burden or
cost.”22 The Rule provides for challenges by requesting parties for
production from inaccessible sources, to be ordered upon a showing of
“good cause.”23
[6] This is an innovative and practical resolution to the concerns
identified in the Public Hearings about e-discovery.24 Despite criticism
that it was not needed,25 the Advisory Committee adopted the Rule to help

19

STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-30.
Id. at C-70.
21
Id. at C-45 to C-46.
22
Id.
23
Id. at C-45 to C-46.
On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from
whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing
is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources
if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of
Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
Id.
24
At the Public Hearings, witnesses confirmed that a process of focusing on readily
accessible electronic information effectively resolves most disputes and that a similar
process is already firmly established in the hard copy world (albeit without the
affirmative identification requirement).
25
The proposed amendment was criticized by some as unnecessary, given the discretion
under existing rules regarding the limitation of discovery. See Ronald J. Hedges, A View
from the Bench and the Trenches: A Critical Appraisal of Some Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 F.R.D. 123, 128 (2005) (stating that
bifurcation of discovery is unnecessary because the dispute is all “about the difficulty and
costs of retrieving data, accessible or not”); accord Henry S. Noyes, “Is E-Discovery So
Different That It Requires New Discovery Rules? An Analysis of Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” 71 TENN. L. REV. 585, 615 (2004) (arguing that
there is “no clear demand for reform” because most of the recorded complaints arise from
the “defense bar’s need to further limit the scope and amount of discovery”).
20
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curb excessive expense and streamline discovery in a majority of cases.26
The Rule continues the tradition of the 1983 reforms, which were designed
to achieve a similar purpose by introducing “proportionality, balance and
common sense” into Rule 26(b).27
[7] As noted, the Rule provides a process for challenging the designation
of a source as “not reasonably accessible” and a method for trumping
inaccessibility, even if established, by proof of “good cause.”28 A
producing party defending a decision not to produce by reason of
inaccessibility has the burden of proof, and the issue can be raised by
either party. The Committee Note suggests that targeted discovery,
including the use of sampling,29 may be necessary in some cases to resolve
disputes if the parties are unable to agree.30 The court can order
26

See generally The Sedona Principles, supra note 11. Sedona Principle number eight
states:
The primary source of electronic data and documents for productions
should be active data and information purposefully stored in a manner
that anticipates future business use and permits efficient searching and
retrieval. Resort to disaster recovery backup tapes and other sources of
data and documents require the requesting party to demonstrate need
and relevance that outweigh the cost, burden and disruption of
retrieving and processing the data from such sources.
Id.
27
Letter from Arthur Miller, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Peter G. McCabe,
Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (February 10, 2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/04-CV-219.pdf; see also 8 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (2d ed. 1994). The
Advisory Committee anticipates that a requesting party will evaluate the information
from accessible sources before insisting that the responding party search for, retrieve and
produce whatever responsive information may be found in inaccessible sources. See
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-48 (“[I]n many cases the responding
party will be able to produce information from reasonably accessible sources that will
fully satisfy the parties’ discovery needs”).
28
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-46.
29
See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (ordering “test run” of
backup tape restoration to determine whether the sample justifies further search).
30
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-48 (stating that “[s]uch discovery
might take the form of requiring the responding party to conduct a sampling of
information contained on the sources identified as not reasonably accessible; allowing
some form of inspection of such sources; or taking depositions of witnesses
knowledgeable about the responding party’s information systems”). The issue of
accessibility and good cause for production are normally so intertwined that a single
hearing may suffice to resolve both types of challenges. Id. at C-49.
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production of discoverable information from inaccessible sources,
provided that the burdens and costs are justified by the circumstances of
the case.31 The court retains the discretion to shift some of the retrieval
costs but is not required to do so, in contrast to the mandatory practice
urged by some for inclusion in the Rule.32
[8] The approach in proposed Rule 26(b)(2)(B) is intended to be
technologically neutral. Existing case law under Rule 26(c)33 involving
cost shifting in electronic discovery may provide some useful guidance on
whether ordering access to a particular source involves “undue burden or
cost.”34 Magnetic backup tapes used for disaster recovery purposes,35
legacy data stored on obsolete and unused media, and information on
databases not programmed to produce the information sought are typical
examples of inaccessible sources in today’s applications.36 The test is not
whether the source of information is routinely accessed in the ordinary
course of business; the reference to “undue burden or cost” was added in
31

Id. at C-46, C-47. The proposed Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2) also articulates a
fairly precise series of factors intended to help guide the process of identifying when
“good cause” may exist. Id. at C-49.
32
The Advisory Committee was not prepared to re-open old wounds and mandate costshifting as a deterrent to overbroad discovery requests. Contra TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4
(requiring payment of the reasonable costs of any “extraordinary steps required” to
produce electronic information). The proposed Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2)
suggests that a court may condition production from inaccessible sources on payment of
“the reasonable costs of obtaining information” and that the “burdens in reviewing the
information for relevance and privilege” can be used as a basis for denial of discovery.
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-50.
33
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (providing that a court may limit discovery which involves
“undue burden or expense”).
34
Differentiation based on accessibility of electronically stored information was used in
an early Zubulake decision to allocate the costs of access to various types of storage
media. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter
Zubulake I]. Inherent in such an assessment is the concept of avoiding undue burdens.
For example, in Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01-2373-M1V, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2003), the court found that it would be an
“undue” burden to require the restoration of the 996 network backup tapes at issue and
ordered cost-sharing formula subject to a protocol. Id. at *9.
35
Medtronic Somafor Danek, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587, at *25–26 (discussing the
burdens involved in converting from backup tape format to a format that a computer can
read followed by elimination of duplicates and conversion to a standard format so that a
search program may seek information from the restored tapes).
36
See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-42.
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part to emphasize that differentiation is intended to be made solely on that
basis.37
A NOTE ON IDENTIFICATION
[9] Under Rule 26(b)(2)(B), the producing party must “identify” to the
requesting party a description of any inaccessible sources of potentially
responsive information that it does not intend to search or utilize for
production.38 The affirmative requirement that a party disclose what it has
not undertaken to search is new to American discovery practice,39
although firmly embedded in English Practice Directions regarding
The
electronic disclosure,40 and its impact remains to be seen.
37

An initial reference in the Committee Note suggested that a party may not rely upon
the rule if a party actually accesses the requested information, even if the costs of doing
so were substantial. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, AUGUST 2004, supra note 5, at 12.
The final Committee Note effectively overrules this comment through its emphasis on
burdens and costs of access regardless of use. See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 2, at C-45 to C-46; see also Sarah A. L. Phillips, Comment, Discoverability of
Electronic Data Under the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: How Effective Are Proposed Protections for “Not Reasonably Accessible”
Data?, 83 N.C.L. REV. 984, 1005 (2005) (arguing the rationale for protecting data not
accessed in the ordinary course of business disappears when changing technology makes
it possible to retrieve information inexpensively).
38
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (Proposed Official Draft 2006) (requiring parties
to identify sources of information that were not searched when using electronic discovery
methods) with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing a party to concentrate on files from
which one can anticipate finding discoverable documents when using hard copy
discovery methods.)
39
Typically, courts only asserted that power in response to a specific controversy and as
part of a motion to compel. See Zhou v. Pittsburg State University, No. 01-2493-KHV,
2003 WL 1905988, *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 2003) (ordering a producing party to describe
efforts made to search for information).
40
Since October 2005, parties in English High Court cases have operated under a
Practice Direction which requires parties to identify efforts to search, or not search,
categories of electronic documents by type and location. The requirement stems from the
general “disclosure” practice regarding information subject to disclosure under CPR Rule
31.7(3). See Department for Constitutional Affairs, Practice Direction – Disclosure and
Inspection,
http:www.dca.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/contents/practice_directions/pd_part31.htm#ID
AUWVRD (last visited April 18, 2006). A suggested disclosure statement form can be
found in the Annex to the Practice Direction. The form gives specific examples of the
categories and types of disclosures that are contemplated but publicly available
experience under the Program Direction is not yet available.
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identification “should, to the extent possible, provide enough detail to
enable the requesting party to evaluate the burdens and costs of providing
the discovery and the likelihood of finding responsive information on the
identified sources.”41 A party can satisfy the requirement by listing a
generic “category or type.”42 The adequacy of generic disclosures may be
questioned and discovery required if the parties cannot agree upon
whether the sources should be searched.
[10] In the end, the identification requirement may well prove to be the
single most creative and far-reaching change in the Proposed Rules.43 As
a minimum, it will place a premium on developing a pro-active and
aggressive appreciation of the myriad alternative sources of potentially
responsive information that may attend an individual case.
PRESERVATION AND THE AMENDMENTS
[11] Advocates for e-discovery rule changes, such as the author, typically
sought greater certainty in the definition of the requirements for
preservation of electronically stored information before discovery
commenced.44 However, the Amendments in their final form neither
articulate such preservation requirements with precision nor set forth a
standard of care to help in making preservation decisions.45 While the
Advisory Committee initially considered drafting explicit rules to describe
preservation obligations, including the “trigger” or onset of such

41

See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-48.
Id. at C-47.
43
See Richard Acello, E-mail to Lawyers: E-Discovery Rules on the Way, A.B.A. J.,
October 7, 2005, http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/oc7rules.html (quoting Greg
Joseph, an authority on federal procedure, to the effect that the identification requirement
is the only real change in Rule 26(b)(2)).
44
See Allman, supra note 1, at 209 (suggesting a rule which would have provided that
“[n]othing in these rules shall require the responding party to suspend or alter the
operation in good faith of disaster recovery or other electronic or computer systems
absent [a] court order issued upon good cause shown”).
45
See Letter from Robert L. Byman, Chairman, American College of Trial Lawyers, to
Peter G. McCabe, Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (Jan. 25, 2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery.html (recommending that the Advisory
Committee include a standard of reasonableness for both preservation and production).
42
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obligations, at least after litigation commenced,46 it ultimately elected not
to tackle that thorny issue and instead focused on early discussion of
preservation issues in hopes of forcing agreement or facilitating an early
court ruling.47
[12] Thus, while the Committee Notes endorse an effective use of the
“litigation hold” process48 and emphasize the need to carefully assess the
implications of the routine operations of information systems,49 it is to the
evolving case law to which counsel seeking to make tough preservation
decisions must principally turn. The basics are fairly clear. The
obligation to preserve discoverable evidence in electronic form pending
discovery can arise before the filing of a complaint, since its focus is on
maintaining information for use at trial.50 Common law preservation
obligations typically arise as a necessary implication of the obligation not

46

The initial version of Rule 37(f), published before the Public Hearings, limited the
scope of its sanction relief to post-litigation conduct because it was conditioned on
meeting preservation obligations defined by the rule as in existence only after litigation
commenced. STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-86. Proposed Rule
37(f), which is intended to relieve some of the harshness of these rules, does not
differentiate based on temporal considerations since its nexus is the impact on the ability
to produce information in discovery. Id. at C-87 (stating that “a party is not permitted to
exploit the routine operation of an information system to thwart discovery obligations by
allowing that operation to continue in order to destroy specific stored information that it
is required to preserve”) (emphasis added).
47
Id. at C-87.
Whether good faith would call for steps to prevent the loss of
information on sources that the party believes are not reasonably
accessible under Rule 26(b)(2) depends on the circumstances of each
case. One factor is whether the party reasonably believes that the
information on such sources is likely to be discoverable and not
available from reasonably accessible sources.
Id.
48
Id. (describing actions taken pursuant to a “litigation hold” process as one aspect of
assessing and executing preservation obligations).
49
Id. at C-87 (stating that “[a] preservation obligation may arise from many sources,
including common law, statutes, regulations, or a court order in the case”).
50
See Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (imposing a threshold duty to preserve all documents and information that
may be relevant in litigation once the obligation arises); Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns
Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 516–17 (D. Md. 2005) (holding that a preservation duty was
triggered by conversations with supervisor prior to filing of EEOC complaint).
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to spoliate evidence needed for trial.51 Some statutory or regulatory
retention requirements can also create preservation obligations cognizable
in litigation.52 Moreover, criminal penalties can be invoked against
someone who destroys information in contemplation of a federal
investigation or proceeding with the intent to obstruct that matter.53
[13] The onset of the preservation obligation, known as the “triggering”
event, is usually marked by receipt of a pre-suit demand or the filing of a
complaint but, in some cases, pre-litigation events are sufficiently
predictive to invoke the obligation. The ability to self-designate sources
of potentially discoverable information as inaccessible under Rule
26(b)(2)(B) does not change the responsibility to assess preservation
imperatives.54 There is a general consensus that the discharge of
preservation obligations involves “reasonable and good faith efforts” to
identify electronic information that may be relevant, but it is manifestly
“unreasonable to expect parties to take every conceivable step to preserve
all potentially relevant” electronically stored information.55 A flexible and
51

See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001).
See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2001). Under
some circumstances, regulations can create the requisite obligation to retain records even
if the litigation involving the records is not reasonably foreseeable. For such a duty to
attach, however, the party seeking the inference must be a member of the general class of
persons that the regulatory agency sought to protect in promulgating the rule. Id.
53
Congress expanded the obstruction of justice statute to include actions undertaken “in
relation to or contemplation of” any federal investigation or case. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519
(West Supp. 2005). See Dana E. Hill, Note, Anticipatory Obstruction of Justice: Preemptive Document Destruction under the Sarbanes-Oxley Anti-Shredding Statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1519, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1519, 1565–69 (2004) (discussing the potential
imposition of criminal liability for the destruction of information pursuant to a records
retention policy).
54
It was argued under the former proposal that the issue could be avoided by a producing
party who improperly designated information as inaccessible, destroyed it before
discovery began, and then pleaded that it did not know it was discoverable. See
Developments in the Law: Electronic Discovery, Electronic Discovery and Cost Shifting:
Who Foots the Bill?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1639, 1678 (2005) (stating that “[i]n this
regard, the proposed amendments would legalize spoliation of electronic data”).
However, the Advisory Committee never intended such a result. Both Proposed Rule
26(b)(2) and Proposed Rule 37(f) make it quite clear that preservation decisions are
separated from the production process.
55
The Sedona Principles, supra note 11. Sedona Principle 5 provides that “[t]he
obligation to preserve electronic data and documents requires reasonable and good faith
52
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innovative approach is required, based on creative implementation of the
“litigation hold” process and rooted in knowledge of the potential sources
of discoverable information in use.56
EARLY PRESERVATION DISCUSSIONS
[14] Traditionally, initial decisions about preservation obligations have
been made unilaterally by the producing party with any challenges coming
later, if at all, in the context of motions seeking sanctions.57 However, the
paradigm of a producing party acting independently, and somewhat
cavalierly, in determining its preservation obligations is modified by the
Proposed Rules.58 Rule 26(f) will now require that parties meet “as soon
as practicable” in order to “discuss any issues relating to preserving
discoverable information.”59 The Rule 16(b) scheduling order will reflect
the results of these discussions based on the discovery plan developed by
the parties. Revisions to Rule 16(b) and Revised Form 35 (“Report of
Parties Planning Meeting”), Para. 3 (“Discovery Plan”) will effectuate this
approach.60
efforts . . . [but] it is unreasonable to expect parties to take every conceivable step to
preserve all potentially relevant data.” Id.
56
For an articulation of a litigation hold process by a member of the Advisory Committee
during the time of the Proposed Rules, see Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D.
422 (S.D. N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter Zubulake V]. The suggestions of the Court are detailed
with respect to the discussion of the respective roles of inside and outside counsel. The
principles to be employed are the same whether the threat is of litigation or governmental
regulatory action. See Cutler, Stegman & Helms, Document Preservation and
Production in Connection with Securities and Exchange Commission Investigations and
Enforcement Actions, 1517 PLI/Corp 579, 593 (2005).
57
Motions for sanctions challenging the performance of preservation obligations are
fairly routine when the loss of information is perceived to have impacted the ability to
conduct a fair trial. See, e.g., Coleman v. Morgan Stanley, No. CA 03-5045 AI, 2005
WL 674885, at *10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2005) (imposing a jury instruction to take allegations of
complaint as proven due to failures to produce emails).
58
See The Sedona Principles, supra note 11 (stating that “[r]esponding parties are best
situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies appropriate for
preserving and producing their own electronic data and documents”). This principle is
undoubtedly still true under the Proposed Rules, but the approach must now include
making persuasive use of the information about those “procedures, methodologies and
technologies” in discussions with opposing parties and court submissions.
59
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-31.
60
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-36.
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[15] The emphasis on early discussion of preservation issues is, in part, a
response to the complaints about the unwelcome growth of an abusive
sanctions practice aimed at the preservation context.61 The Advisory
Committee considered and rejected promoting increased reliance on the
use of preservation orders because of concern about potentially overbroad
orders.62 Accordingly, the Committee Note discourages overuse of
preservation orders by citing the cautionary language from the Manual for
Complex Litigation, section 11.422, to the effect that “a blanket
preservation order may be prohibitively expensive and unduly
burdensome.”63 The Note also cautions that preservation orders issued
“over objection should be narrowly tailored” and that “[e]x parte
preservation orders should issue only in exceptional circumstances.”64
[16] Adjusting to the new paradigm of early discussion will require
cooperation from both sides of the aisle. Requesting parties must do a
better job of articulating their focus – and do it early and often. Producing
parties must come to the table prepared to candidly discuss the steps they
have taken to preserve any sources of potentially discoverable evidence
that they believe may be implicated.
OTHER TOPICS FOR EARLY DISCUSSION
[17] A pair of difficult issues for both producing and requesting parties
has been the manner in which production is to be made and the way in
which the inadvertent production of electronically stored information of
privileged and trial preparation materials is to be handled. Proposed Rule
61

The Advisory Committee heard substantial testimony to the effect that a preoccupation
with sanction practice had replaced, in the judgment of some, a focus on the merits of the
case. Spoliation sanctions are very much on the mind of the trial bar. See Robert L.
Pottroff, Sanctions: Don’t Leave Home Without ‘Em, 1 Ann. 2003 ATLA-CLE 1017
(2003) (stating that “no case should be litigated without at least investigating the
possibility that evidence has been destroyed, hidden or tampered with by the opposing
party”).
62
See Treppel v. Biovail, No. 03 Civ. 3002, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4407, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2006) (explaining that full compliance with a preservation order can
protect a producing party from sanctions if, absent such an order, otherwise discoverable
information is lost because a party miscalculates its preservation obligations).
63
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-34 (quoting MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.422 (2004).
64
Id. at C-35.
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26(f) will also require discussion of both of these topics, and Rules 16(b)
and Form 35 will be changed to encourage and accommodate any
agreements reached on either topic.
[18] Thus: (a) Form of Production. One issue is whether and to what
extent a party seeking production should be forced to specify a particular
form or forms of production. Under some state e-discovery provisions,
the party requesting information must make a request, which can be
contested.65 The Advisory Committee opted for a middle ground: a
requesting party may, but need not, specify a preferred form or forms, but
the responding party must either assent to the choice or indicate its
intended form of production, which can be contested. Production need be
made in only one form, however.66
[19] The Proposed Rule also provides that, if the parties are unable to
reach agreement or a court order is not entered, the information must be
produced “either in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained, or
in a form or forms that are reasonably usable.”67 If the information is
maintained in a way that makes it “searchable by electronic means,” then
“the information should not be produced in a form that removes or
significantly degrades this feature.”68
[20] The “reasonably useable” alternative was substituted after the Public
Hearings for a controversial option under which production could be in
“an electronically searchable form.”69 Producing in a “reasonably
useable” form may require that the producing party furnish technical
assistance, information on application software, or other reasonable types
of assistance.70
65

See TEX. R. CIV. PRO. 196.4 (1999).
Proposed Rule 34(b) states: “[u]nless the parties otherwise agree, or the court otherwise
orders: (iii) a party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more
than one form.” STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-73. Some courts
have held that a party may be entitled to both a hard copy and electronic versions of the
same information. See id.; McNally Tunneling Corp. v. City of Evanston, 2001 WL
1568879, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2001).
67
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-77.
68
Id.
69
Id. at C-78.
70
Id. at C-77.
66
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[21] Neither default form is intended to mandate production of metadata
or embedded data.71 The Advisory Committee discussed the competing
concerns at some length but ultimately decided that the best course of
action was to remain silent and leave the issue to individual case law
development.72 Metadata, for example, or information about information,
varies in value or importance depending upon the matters at issue.73 It is
rarely at issue in the majority of cases. A requesting party may and should
request a form of production that includes metadata if it believes it to be
essential, and a producing party must either accede to the request or state
an objection. Ultimately, the matter is for the court to decide if the parties
are unable to agree.74
[21] (b) Inadvertent Waiver by Production. The parties must also
discuss possible agreements to govern post-production claims of privilege
or protection of trial preparation materials. The Committee Note to Rule
26(f) refers to “quick peek” agreements which allow a requesting party
access to potentially privileged information without such access
constituting a waiver.75 The requesting party can then make a narrower
request, thus reducing the review burden on the parties and the courts.
The Committee Note also mentions a “clawback agreement,” which
allows parties to agree in advance that inadvertent production does not
constitute a waiver of privilege or protection for trial preparation
71

But see Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 657 (D. Kan. 2005)
(interpreting an order requiring production of Excel spreadsheet in form maintained to
require production of associated metadata). The presence of metadata – hidden
information about the information portrayed – is one of the distinguishing features of
electronic discovery.
72
See Advisory Committee Minutes, April 2005, supra note 15, at 19. Some Advisory
Committee members cautioned that to “technically adept lawyers and experts,” the
reference to production in a form in which it was “ordinarily maintained” included
metadata and embedded data, while production in a “reasonably useable” form did not
have that connotation. Id.
73
The Sedona Principles, supra note 11 (suggesting that a party should not be required to
preserve or produce metadata absent a clear requirement based on an agreement or court
order to do so).
74
Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 652. Magistrate Judge Waxse argues that emerging standards
require a responding party faced with a request for production as an “active file” or for
production in “native format” to affirmatively object to that request or be bound by it. Id.
at 652 n.69.
75
See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-36.
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materials.76 Absent such an agreement or court order, amended Rule
26(b)(5)(B) will provide that the party making the claim of inadvertent
production may notify the party receiving the information and trigger an
obligation to “promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified
information.”77 The Rule also requires the receiving party to neither use
nor disclose the information until the claim is resolved.78
[22] Any attempt to deal with evidentiary privilege issues in the Federal
Rules is potentially controversial in light of the statutory mandate that
substantive changes receive affirmative approval by Congress.79 The
Advisory Committee did not intend to deal with the substantive issue of
privilege waiver through its proposals.80 Some commentators, however,
expressed concern about the original proposals, for fear of the
consequences in related to third party litigation. One commentator
opposing the rule stated that “[t]he language under consideration [in the
initial proposal] does not account for these likely scenarios and might give
unsuspecting attorneys a false sense of security.”81
SANCTION LIMITATIONS (“SAFE HARBOR”)
[23] Proposed Rule 37(f) will limit rule-based sanctions for the failure to
provide information in discovery when the loss results from a “routine,
good-faith” operation.82 The Proposed Rule will not apply in “exceptional
76

Id. The efficacy of this approach was the subject of much debate at the Public
Hearings held in early 2005 and has been called into question by at least one court since
then. See Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 231 (D. Md. 2005).
77
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-57.
78
Id.
79
See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000) (any rule “creating, abolishing, or modifying an
evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by an Act of
Congress”).
80
Currently, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules is considering proposed Rule
502, which would set forth the scope of a waiver and extend the binding impact of a court
approved selective waiver agreement to third parties in federal and state courts.
81
See Noyes, supra note 25, at 648–649. The Committee subsequently amended
proposed Rule 16(b) so as to eliminate language which “might seem to promise greater
protection than can be assured.” STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-28.
82
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-86 (stating that “[a]bsent
exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party
for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good
faith operation of an electronic information system”).
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circumstances” and it only explicitly limits sanctions whose authority rests
on the Federal Rules.83 Limited and restricted though it may be,84 it
nonetheless is a significant step towards bringing a sense of proportion
and rationality to the debate over corporate and individual responsibility.85
[24] Early proposals for a “safe harbor” sought to address the issue by
requiring a prior preservation order and limiting sanctions to only those
losses which resulted from willful violations of the order.86 Selecting and
preserving potentially discoverable electronically stored information for
specific cases is very difficult in a business environment where disaster
recovery tapes and active data are routinely overwritten or discarded for
policy reasons unrelated to litigation.87 The problem is exacerbated by the
presence of multiple litigations. Information preserved for one case is
theoretically available for other cases, compounding the volume and
increasing the burden and complexity of searching for discoverable
information. It is virtually impossible to achieve perfect compliance, a

83

Id.
The elements of judicial discretion present in revised Rule 37(f) have prompted some
to question whether it is still reasonable to refer to it as a “safe harbor.” See Kenneth J.
Withers, We’ve Moved the Two Tiers and Filled in the Safe Harbor: Federal Rulemakers
Respond to Public Comments on Electronic Discovery, FED. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 54
(noting that the phrase “safe harbor” is “no longer apt, if it ever was”).
85
The final form of Rule 37(f) emerged at the April 2005 meeting of the Advisory
Committee. The compromise was adopted by a 9-2 vote and, with slight changes, is part
of the Proposed Rules now before Congress. Advisory Committee Minutes, April 2005,
supra note 15, at 43.
86
Thomas Y. Allman, The Case for a Preservation Safe Harbor in Requests for EDiscovery, 70 DEF. COUN. J. 417, 423 (2003).
No sanctions or other relief predicated upon a failure to preserve
information shall be entered in the absence of an order that describes
with particularity the specific information to be preserved and a finding
that the party who failed to preserve such information acted willfully or
willfully failed to act. Evidence that reasonable steps were undertaken
to notify custodians of the relevant information of the obligation to
preserve the information shall be prima facie evidence of compliance
with obligations under such preservation order.
Id.
87
See generally Eric Friedberg, To Recycle or Not to Recycle, That Is the Hot Backup
Tape Question, 22 No. 12 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 16 (2005) (commenting on how
the Zubulake V court’s suggested preservation obligations are not practical or realistic).
84
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standard to which some cases point.88 Thus, special treatment for
inadvertently lost electronically stored information makes sense from a
public policy standpoint. As Professor Martin Redish has noted, the loss
of electronically stored information in a routine business context cannot
fairly be said to support a presumption that the individual involved (or his
or her employer) acted with an intent to spoliate.89 Proof of a heightened
degree of culpability should be required.90
[25] The need for any safe harbor was hotly debated. To some, the need
seemed obvious in light of the mounting evidence that sanctions were
being sought in instances where parties had attempted to take reasonable
steps to meet their preservation obligations.91 Others saw in the reported
decisions no evidence of a reason to act. A study noted that most courts
did not sanction for the “smallest infractions,” although they sometimes
“sanction[ed] negligent but prejudicial conduct.”92
In response,

88

See Thomas Y. Allman, Ruling Offers Lessons for Counsel on Electronic Discovery
Abuse, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 15, 2004, at 1, 2 (pointing out that Zubulake V
appears to allow “no room for error, carelessness or preoccupation with other
responsibilities” on the part of employees served with a litigation hold notice).
89
Martin R. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L. J. 561,
621 ( 2001) (noting that “[e]lectronic evidence destruction, if done routinely in the
ordinary course of business, does not automatically give rise to an inference of
knowledge of specific documents’ destruction, much less intent to destroy those
documents for litigation-related reasons”); accord Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer
Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that only in cases of intentional
failure to preserve is it fair to presume that evidence would be harmful to the spoliator).
90
One can draw an analogy to the policy requirement in the Private Securities Act, in
which a safe harbor from liability can only be defeated by proof of actual knowledge of
the false or misleading nature of a forward-looking statement subject to the rule. See 15
U.S.C. § 77z-2(c) (2000).
91
“Reasonable steps do not always preserve everything. Things slip through. That is the
point of the safe harbor.” Advisory Committee Minutes, April 2005, supra note 15, at 18;
see also Memorandum from Myles V. Lynk, Chair, Discovery Subcomm. & Richard
Marcus, Special Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules to the Participants in February
2004 Fordham E-Discovery Conference 34 (Jan. 27, 2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/E-Discovery_Conf_Agenda_Materials.pdf.
92
Shira A. Scheindlin and Kanchana Wangkeo, Electronic Discovery Sanctions in the
Twenty-First Century, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 71, 73, 94 (2004),
http://www.mttlr.org/voleleven/scheindlin.pdf (reporting on the results of a review of
forty-five federal cases and twenty-one state sanction cases).
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proponents of a safe harbor argued that it was the fear of sanctions that
produced an unfair chilling effect.93
[26] In the end, the Advisory Committee adopted a compromise limitation
that applies only to losses from “routine, good faith” operations. A
“routine operation” is one that involves “the ways in which such systems
are generally designed, programmed, and implemented to meet the party’s
technical and business needs.”94 A broad range of business systems are
included within the potential scope of the Rule.95 The distinguishing
factor is whether the loss occurred in the context of a “good faith”
operation of the system in question, taking into account any steps
undertaken relating to the execution of preservation obligations. This
necessarily implicates the scope and rationality of the litigation hold
process which has been followed in that case.96 The mere failure to
prevent the loss of information does not bar protection from sanctions,
since conduct is to be judged by a “good faith” standard intermediate
between absolute perfection and willful misconduct.97
93

At the Public Hearings, proponents of the “safe harbor” strongly supported an
alternative formulation for Rule 37(f) proposed by the Advisory Committee that would
have required proof of willful or reckless conduct before sanctions could be imposed.
The primary version of Rule 37(f) as then proposed would not have applied if the loss of
the otherwise discoverable information had been due to negligence or failure to meet a
court order. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, AUGUST 2004, supra note 5, at 32–33.
The Advisory Committee resolved the debate by the compromise formulation discussed
in the text.
94
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-87.
95
Id. at C-83.
Examples . . . include programs that recycle storage media kept for brief periods
against the possibility of a disaster that broadly affects computer operations;
automatic overwriting of information that has been “deleted”; programs that
change metadata (automatically created identifying information about the
history or management of an electronic file) to reflect the latest access to
particular electronically stored information; and programs that automatically
discard information that has not been accessed within a defined period or that
exists beyond a defined period without an affirmative effort to store it for a
longer period.
Id.
96
See id. at C-85 (noting that “[t]he steps taken to implement an effective litigation hold
bear on good faith, as does compliance with any agreements the parties have reached
regarding preservation and with any court orders directing preservation”).
97
See id. at C-84 (noting that “the Advisory Committee . . . revised Rule 37(f) to adopt a
culpability standard intermediate between the two published versions. The proposed rule
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[27] Rule 37(f), despite falling short of the full protection originally
sought, nonetheless provides more certainty than may be available under
existing case law.98 It is consistent with better reasoned decisions
challenging losses due to the application of record retention programs.99
The use of a “good faith” standard – with its connotations of reasonability
and deference to common sense – is not unusual in the business or
litigation context.100
EXCEPTIONS
[28] Proposed Rule 37(f) contains a number of exceptions. First, Rule
37(f) on its face applies only to rule-based sanctions. It does not purport
to address situations where no prior order of discovery has issued and
parties have resorted to the inherent powers of the trial courts.101
However, federal courts may resist the temptation to invoke their inherent
powers to reach contrary results from those which would apply under Rule
37(f). They may consider Rule 37(f) and its underlying polices to provide
persuasive guidance for the resolution of disputes involving electronically
provides protection from sanctions only for the ‘good faith’ routine operation of an
electronic system”).
98
The effect of mere negligence in complying with preservation obligations is unsettled.
Compare Se. Med. Supply v. Boyles, Moak & Brickell Ins., 822 So.2d 323, 329 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2002) (ruling that destruction of computer files pursuant to a routine business
procedure was not subject to sanctions where party had made duplicate copy), with
DaimlerChrysler Motors v. Bill Davis Racing, No. Civ. A. 03-72265, 2005 WL 3502172,
*2–3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2005) (containing a jury instruction indicating the
appropriateness of sanctions while telling the jury to “presume, based upon the spoliation,
that the evidence destroyed would have been favorable to plaintiff,” despite the fact that
the “destruction of evidence in this case was negligent and not willful”).
99
Courts addressing sanctions for loss of information in that context require proof of
breach of a known preservation obligation by a party acting with a “culpable” state of
mind and a resulting prejudice to the party or the trial. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Union
Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 747 (8th Cir. 2004) (requiring “some indication of an intent to
destroy the evidence for the purpose of obstructing or suppressing the truth”).
100
Compare the application of the business judgment rule to director conduct, whereby
exculpation from personal liability for bad business decisions is available so long as the
director acted in “good faith.” Eric J. Friedman, Changing Currents for Directors’
Duties, 1467 PLI/Corp 11, 17–21 (2005).
101
See MOSAID Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 333 (D.N.J.
2004) (noting a failure to institute a litigation hold).
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stored information in the absence of rule-based sanctions.102 One court
has already done so.103
[29] Second, the protection of Rule 37(f) is inapplicable if “exceptional
circumstances” are present. This “safety valve” acknowledges that even a
non-negligent loss of information can have highly prejudicial impact in
some circumstances and render protection inappropriate.104 However, that
does not mean that sanctions are automatic in such a case and a court
would be guided by the existing precedent in that judicial circuit on the
issue.
[30] Finally, as the Committee Note stresses, the limitations in Rule 37(f)
are applicable only to “sanctions,” and not to “the kinds of adjustments
frequently used in managing discovery if a party is unable to provide
relevant responsive information.”105
A NOTE ON CORPORATE RETENTION POLICIES
[31] The potential impact of the Proposed Rules on the evolution of
corporate policy was a topic of much contention during the rule-making
process. Opponents of party-designated initial production argued that
producing parties might “game” the process by simply making all
102

Such respect for Rule limitations in the face of inherent powers is not unknown. For
example, in the case of Brandt v. Vulcan, Inc., the Seventh Circuit refused to suggest that
a court should have exercised its inherent powers to sanction discovery misconduct where
the District Court had concluded that it lacked power to do so because of limitations
under Rule 37(b)(2). 30 F.3d 752, 757 n.9 (7th Cir. 1994).
103
See Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., where Magistrate Judge Francis relied
upon an earlier version of proposed Rule 37(f) in absolving a party of the failure to
undertake to preserve certain “ephemeral” information in the absence of a discovery
order. 223 F.R.D. 162, 177 (S.D. N.Y. 2004),
104
See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-88 (stating that “this provision
recognizes that in some circumstances a court should provide remedies to protect an
entirely innocent party requesting discovery against serious prejudice arising from the
loss of potentially important information”).
105
Id. The Advisory Committee was aware that “case management orders” are a
necessary and frequent part of the administration of justice and clarified that point in the
Committee Note to Rule 37(f), which states that “a court [can] order the responding party
to produce an additional witness for deposition, respond to additional interrogatories, or
make similar attempts to provide substitutes or alternatives for some or all of the lost
information.”
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electronic information difficult to access.106 A similar argument was
levied against the “safe harbor” proposal on the ground that it would
improperly encourage premature elimination of electronic information.
[32] Both arguments miss the mark widely. Retention policies are
typically adopted and implemented for business reasons, and no rational
executive will or can long countenance deliberate attempts to make
business information inaccessible for ordinary use.107 Underlying both
arguments was the unstated assumption that some generalized public
policy requires that all electronic information must be retained forever.108
The Advisory Committee wisely rejected both arguments,109 especially in
light of the potential civil and criminal ramifications of taking deliberate
obstructing action in the face of litigation demands.110
[33] In fact, the Proposed Rules will have a positive influence by
increasing the awareness of the need for effective corporate policies
106

A similar argument was made on policy grounds against cost shifting based on
accessibility. The initial proposal provided only that “[a] party need not provide
discovery of electronically stored information that the party identifies as not reasonably
accessible.” See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, AUGUST 2004, supra note 5, at 26.
Proposed Rule 26(b)(2)(B) now focuses on the sources of such information and adds
“because of undue burden or cost” onto the end of the rule. See STANDING COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 2, at C-50.
107
Effective compliance with legal and ethical obligations is a primary goal of corporate
compliance policies. The corporate guidelines in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
U.S.S.G § 8B2.1, were enhanced at the direction of Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Pub. L. No. 107-2004, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
108
See The Sedona Principles, supra note 11 (select “Publications” on the left side of the
screen, then choose the appropriate link); cf. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P. v. United States,
544 U.S. 696, 704-05 (2005) (stating that retention policies which lead to the destruction
of information are common and appropriate in the absence of specific requirements of
law).
109
The concern that a party will deliberately “bury” information to avoid litigation
demands is something of a red herring. As the Standing Committee noted, “A party that
makes information inaccessible [in a case] because it is likely to be discoverable in
litigation is subject to sanctions now and would still be subject to sanctions under the
proposed rule change.” STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-45.
110
Congress has stiffened existing law and added new criminal penalties for one who
knowingly alters or destroys documents with the intent to impede a federal investigation
or proceeding or “in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1519 (West Supp. 2005). See Hill, supra note 53 (discussing impact of statute on
destruction of information pursuant to records retention policies).
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governing the use and retention of electronic information, especially
email.
Policies have historically been fragmented and somewhat
dysfunctional in this area. Those sponsored by the information technology
functions have often focused on the size of mailboxes as the primary
management tool for email.111 On the other hand, records retention
policies often rely on individual users to select email for retention based
on content and office file plans.112 The interplay between the two
necessarily involves difficult choices. For example, a user might be
required to apply retention categories with a set period of days or have it
lost to automatic deletion.113
[34] The challenge is to integrate these competing and functional interests
with litigation and compliance imperatives without impairing or degrading
the efficient use of electronic systems. In some cases, this can be as
simple as reviewing and revising existing policies to make them more
realistic and to enhance training to meet identified expectations especially
in regard to implementing litigation holds.114 In other cases, however, it
may involve consideration of technological solutions, such as some form
of electronic archiving.115
Any solution adopted will involve a
111

See Randy Kahn, Electronic Communication Policies and Procedures, AIIM E-DOC
MAGAZINE, June 24, 2005, http://www.aiim.org/article-docrep.asp?ID=30088.
112
See U.S. Department of the Interior, It’s in the Mail: Common Questions about
Electronic Mail and Official Records,
http://www.doiu.nbc.gov/orientation/email.html#long (last accessed April 25, 2006).
113
Courts sometimes express surprise with imperfect compliance by users with records
retention. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21, 25 (D.D.C.
2004) (noting that it was “astounding” that employees had failed to follow a “print and
retain” requirement in a document retention policy). However, such an occurrence is
perfectly understandable and does not in and of itself indicate a failure to meet
obligations imposed by law. See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 1997 WL
33352759, at *6 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (allowing individual employees to use discretion
whether to retain e-mail is not indicative of bad faith).
114
An entity may, for example, wish to review email retention policies as a first step in a
program to take a holistic look at electronic information management. This will
necessarily involve a focus on competing policy imperatives from among admittedly a
wide range of options. At a minimum, any solution should include an enhancement in
compliance training of individual users to help them adhere to litigation hold policies.
115
See Thomas Y. Allman, Email Retention: Time for a New Approach, AIIM E-Doc
Magazine, Sept./Oct. 2005, http://www.edocmagazine.com/article_new.asp?ID=30580.
Archiving can be implemented by configuration of existing software applications or by
use of dedicated software and hardware designed for that purpose and either hosted or
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compromise among identified “pain points” based on competing budget
constraints, issues of responsibility for implementation (“ownership”), and
concerns over the risk of over-retention, with its own unique problems.116
The Sedona Conference is hard at work attempting to articulate a rational
framework and justification within which individual entities may select
their comfort level in this and three other key areas.117
CONCLUSION: SOME MODEST SUGGESTIONS
[35] The Proposed Rules clearly require considerably more attention by
in-house lawyers to early preparation for electronic discovery and place a
premium on the execution of predictable and well-thought out plans.
Based on my own experience, I can suggest three areas for improvement.
FOCUS ON SOURCES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS
[36] An on-going effort should be made, at least in regard to predictable
types of litigation, to identify potential sources of discoverable
information and to document and assess the burdens and costs associated
with access and retrieval of electronic information from those sources.
This effort will help to better facilitate the assessment of steps needed to
prevent losses of information from those operations (and to justify those
actions in the event they are not fully effective). This approach can best
be accomplished by investing the scarce time needed to develop good
working relationships with appropriate IT personnel and to understand the
actual operation of information applications. This would also help
identify potential testifying witnesses who can assist in briefing outside
made available by third parties. The scope can be individual departments, classes of
employees (such as executives) or entire portions of entities, with varying retention
periods selected by policy. Id.
116
Archival and other technology solutions are often sold on an “ROI” basis which takes
into account avoided costs of expensive storage as offset by the licensing, hardware and
ongoing maintenance costs of the solution. To the extent that additional volumes of
information are retained, the calculations frequently overlook the added costs of access
and review, especially for relevancy and privilege.
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The Sedona Conference WG1 Working Group on Electronic Document Production is
currently in the process of developing Commentaries on four related topics: Email
Management and Archiving, Legacy Data, Search and Retrieval and Litigation Holds.
See The Sedona Principles, supra note 11.
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counsel and appear, if needed, to explain the details to any reviewing
court.
LITIGATION HOLDS
[37] The scope and effectiveness of the litigation hold process, by
whatever name it goes and whether it is formal or informal, should be
enhanced by developing innovative approaches to cover both litigation
and investigative possibilities. At the heart of the process should be a
sliding scale approach to assess and address whatever relevant sources of
information may be understood to exist and to match them to the needs of
the discovery process.
OUTSIDE COUNSEL
[38] The division of effort among counsel in collecting, culling and
producing information in litigation should be reevaluated with an eye to
the emerging emphasis on sources of information. Preparation for the
“meet and confer” process should be enhanced so that outside counsel are
better prepared to accurately discharge their ethical and legal obligations
to both their clients and the court. Candid “after action” assessments of
earlier preservation and production experience should be routine and
meetings should be held with outside counsel and consultants to discuss
mutual expectations in order to ensure that the interests of all parties are
aligned.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

[39] The Proposed Rules constitute a remarkable achievement which
should help establish uniform practices for those unfamiliar with the
unique issues involved in e-discovery.
When coupled with the
suggestions outlined above – and others like them – parties will be better
prepared to participate in the good faith and reasonable approach to ediscovery which will be essential to their success.
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